Connecticut does not need to choose between respecting its Constitution and enacting fiscally responsible budgets. It can and should do both.
budget guardrails
The bond lock impermissibly delegates legislative authority to bondholders
The bond lock is invalid because there is no provision in the state constitution authorizing the legislature to delegate budgeting power to other entities.
The guardrails impermissibly bind future legislatures
The 2017 legislative history of CT’s statutory budget guardrails proves indisputably that they were enacted with the intent to bind future legislatures.
The guardrails violate the majority vote rule
The CT Constitution does not authorize the General Assembly to deny a majority of the House and Senate the right to amend budget laws– except for the limited circumstance of the constitutional state spending cap.
The CT Constitution’s text does not authorize the guardrails
Is there any provision in the state constitution that either explicitly or by implication authorizes the General Assembly to enact the guardrails? No,
Are CT’s budget guardrails constitutional?
Our constitution empowers our elected representatives to assume an active lawmaking role rather than to acquiesce to the passive role imposed by the Guardrails.
